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ENDOGENOUS TRADING IN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
MARC CHESNEY1 DELIA COCULESCU1 AND SELIM GO¨KAY2
Abstract. We introduce a real options model in order to quantify the moral hazard
impact of credit default swap (CDS) positions on the corporate default probabilities.
Moral hazard is widely addressed in the insurance literature, where the insured agent
may become less cautious about preventing the risk from occurring. Importantly, with
CDS the moral hazard problem may be magnified since one can buy multiple protections
for the same bond.
To illustrate this issue, we consider a firm with the possibility of switching from an
investment to another one. An investor can influence the strategic decisions of the firm
and can also trade CDS written on the firm. We analyze how the decisions of the investor
influence the firm value when he is allowed to trade credit default contracts on the firm’s
debt. Our model involves a time-dependent optimal stopping problem, which we study
analytically and numerically - using the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm. We identify the
situations where the investor exercises the switching option with a loss and we measure
the impact on the firm’s value and firm’s default probability. Contrary to the common
intuition, the investors optimal behavior does not systematically consist in buying CDSs
and increase the default probabilities. Instead, large indifference zones exists, where no
arbitrage profits can be realized. As the number of the CDSs in the position increases to
exceed several times the level of a complete insurance, we enter in the zone where arbitrage
profits can be made. These are obtained by implementing very aggressive strategies (i.e.,
increasing substantially the default probability by producing losses to the firm). The
profits increase sharply as we exit the indifference zone.
1. Introduction
Recently there has been much debate about the alleged role of the credit default swaps
(CDS) in the US credit crisis during 2007 and 2008 as well as in the European sovereign
crisis. A CDS is a negotiated financial contract between a seller and a buyer written on
a reference entity’s bond over a fixed period of time. The buyer makes regular premium
payments to the seller and the seller of the contract guarantees the buyer protection in case
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of a credit event of the reference entity (typically default, bankruptcy or some other types
of financial restructuring). Therefore, CDS are similar to classical insurance contracts,
since they provide insurance against default. However, one important difference between
insurance contracts and CDS is that CDS can be used for speculative purposes. Indeed,
an investor can enter a CDS contract without holding the reference entity’s bonds. In this
case, the investor is not exposed to the risk and the CDS contract is said to be naked.
However, in insurance, the principle of insurable interest holds and contracts of this type
are not allowed. The research papers by Jarrow [12], Stulz [21], Brunnermeier [4] provide
a detailed analysis of the CDS markets, their potential costs and benefits for the economy,
including during debt crisis.
The focus in this paper is on the problem of moral hazard. This issue has been well
studied in the literature of insurance and it addresses the problem that the insured agent
may become less cautious about preventing the risk from occurring. Hence, the insurance
may result in an increased likelihood of the insured event. The moral hazard problem
can be magnified in the presence of big CDS positions when they represent overinsurance
against default. In this paper we propose a model, where the management decisions of
the company can be influenced by a shareholder who holds CDS written on the company.
The issue is to investigate to what extent this economic agent will influence the investment
strategy of the firm with the objective to increase the probability of default. We quantify
the impact on the firm’s value and firm’s default probability (microeconomic impact). We
do not investigate any macroeconomic impacts, i.e., effects of CDS on the whole economy.
Also, we do not propose an equilibrium model in the sense that there is a liquid market for
CDS and the investor can buy a limited quantity of CDS without having a market impact.
We consider a firm that holds an investment and has a real option to switch to another
investment opportunity, which is initially suboptimal with respect to the first investment.
The switching decision is irreversible. The firm has liabilities to reimburse at a finite
maturity date. The default event occurs in case the firm has insufficient cash to pay these
liabilities at the given maturity date. In this framework, an investor holds a proportion
of the overall firm’s liabilities (stocks and debt). This enables him/her to influence the
management decisions of the firm, including the switching time determined by the company
to the initially suboptimal investment. Furthermore, this investor has the possibility to
buy CDS written on the firm. These CDS represent a bet on the default of the firm and
thus may lead to moral hazard. In particular, a possible strategy of the agent is to spend
as much as possible to buy CDS contracts and enhance the chances of default by exercising
the switching option with a loss.
To analyze the above outlined model, we first consider the market value of the firm
when the investor is not allowed to trade in CDS. This is done by computing the optimal
switching time to the initially suboptimal investment. Then, we formulate an optimization
problem, when the investor can invest initially some proportion of the available cash for
CDS contracts. Hence, the investor’s strategy constitutes of two elements: First the initial
allocation of cash and CDS contracts and second the switching time. However, for this
analysis, we need the initial market price of the CDS contracts. By assuming that the
market is opaque, we note that the CDS position of the investor is not observed by market
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participants at time 0. Thus, the CDS is priced as if the optimal switching time remains
the same, although the investor is able to influence it. In this setup, we investigate how
the firm’s value with trading CDS is modified.
This choice of strategies for the investor lead us to work within a time-dependent non-
standard optimal stopping framework. After transforming the initial problem into a time-
dependent classical optimal problem we run numerical simulations to study it, using the
Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm. In our numerical experiments we compare the respective
firm’s values with and without the possibility of investing in CDS. Moreover, we study
default probabilities of the firm associated with different strategies. We investigate the
impact of different parameters on the firm values and default probabilities. The different
parameters we consider are the initial cash available, the debt level, the volatilities and the
means of the investments, their correlation, as well as the interest rate.
We observe that there are situations where the investor chooses to exercise the switching
option with a loss. This strategy will enable him to substantially increase the default
probability of the firm so that the optimal value with CDS exceeds the value in the absence
of CDS trading. These situations generally correspond to large positions in CDS with
several times the complete insurance. Since the investor chooses to exercise the switching
option with a loss, it sheds light on the moral hazard problem. However, we also observe
indifference zones, where it is hard to distinguish where CDS trading is actually profitable
for the investor. In these zones, CDS positions are relatively small so that the investor
does not yield additional gains.
The problem of moral hazard in relation with the CDSs has received increasing attention
in the literature recently. The empirical study by Subrahmanyam et al. [22] shows that the
credit risk of reference firms, reflected in rating downgrades and bankruptcies, increases
significantly upon the inception of CDS trading. Hu and Black ([10],[11]) and Hu [9]
introduced the term of empty creditor to name the hedged creditor. They pointed out that
investors that hold bonds for a company near bankruptcy and CDS hedges for those bonds
have interest to chose the bankruptcy option, triggering a ”credit event” and receive the
full-payment on bonds in cash, instead of negotiating with the company in the restructuring
process. This behavior increases the default probabilities of firms. A series of models show
that the empty creditor problem is more complex (Arping [2], Goderis and Wagner [8] and
Sambalaibat [20] who use sovereign debt models, Bolton and Oehmke [3]): hedged creditors
have indeed an increased bargaining power in ex post debt renegotiations but this can be
partially balanced by a disciplining effect ex ante which prevents excessive risk taking by
shareholders, hence reduce the default probabilities.
All the above mentioned literature is concerned with describing how the lending rela-
tionship is affected by the creditors owning CDSs. Our aim here is of a different nature.
We are attached to study the optimal investment decisions in presence of the CDSs as
compared to the situation without the CDSs, when an investor is able to exercise influence
in one firm’s decisions. In this setting, we show how much the firm’s value and default
probability are affected, depending on the size of the CDS position. Precisely because
the relationship debtor-creditor is not within the scope of this paper, we assume that the
investor holds a proportion of the overall firm’s liabilities (i.e., stocks and debt) and a CDS
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position, we thus avoid asymmetric incentives induced when only particular stakeholders
of the firm hold CDSs.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section
2; Section 3 determines the optimal investor’s strategies in absence of CDS. In Section 4,
we quantify the default probability of the firm for the different scenarios of exercise of the
exchange option. Section 5 introduces the optimization problem when the investors has the
possibility of investing a given amount of cash in CDS while holding the firm’s liabilities.
We then present some numerical illustrations in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. A model of a firm with an option to switch the assets
We consider a continuous-time model, where a firm holds an investment and considers at
any time the option to replace it with an investment opportunity (i.e., an asset replacement,
or switching option). We denote by (Ω,F ,P) a probability space, where P is supposed to
be a pricing measure for the financial investors in the economy. W 1 and W 2 are correlated
Brownian motions under the pricing measure P with 〈W 1,W 2〉t = ρt. Let (Ft)t≥0 be the
natural filtration generated by W 1 and W 2.
We assume that the firm’s current investment (a project or an asset) generates net cash
flows at time t ≥ 0 described by:
S1t = x+ µ1t+ σ1W
1
t , S
1
0 = x > 0.
The firm also has an investment opportunity (a second project or asset) that generates net
cash flows as:
S2t = y + µ2t+ σ2W
2
t S
2
0 = y > 0, y < x.
Also, we assume that the default-free short rate is constant, denoted by r, and µ1 > µ2.
As an example, in a duopoly, the firm’s investment opportunity consists in the possibility
of using the same technology as the competitor, hence S2 is the net cash flows of one firm
when the two competitor firms use the same technology. Here we suppose that at time
zero, the firm has a competitive advantage that is, it uses a more profitable technology
(since x > y). In the future the competitive advantage may disappear (if S1 < S2) and
the firm has the option to swap to the same technology as the competitor firm. This
asset replacement is a continuous-time and irreversible decision to be taken, in the sense
of McDonald and Siegel [17].
The NPV (net present value) of the first asset, measured as the present value of the
future cash flows is given by:
v1t :=E
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)S1udu|Ft
]
=
∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)E
[
S1u|Ft
]
du
=
∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)(S1t + µ1(t− u))du =
S1t + µ1/r
r
.
Similarly, for the second asset the NPV is:
v2t := E
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)S2udu|Ft
]
=
S2t + µ2/r
r
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In this context, at time 0 the first project dominates the second one since its NPV is higher.
However, we will show later on that in the presence of CDS, the second asset might be
preferred.
At time 0 the firm holds the first asset, with NPV v10 and a real option to operate in the
future a switch from the first asset to the second one (the asset replacement problem). We
assume that the firm has as a liability a debt contract, for simplicity zero coupon bonds,
with maturity date T and total nominal value N . In view of being able to reimburse
the debt when due, we assume that the net cash flows generated by the firm’s assets are
capitalized on a risk-free account, until the time T > 0.
More precisely, let us denote:
a1t : =
∫ t
0
er(t−u)S1udu
a2t : =
∫ t
0
er(t−u)S2udu
the cumulated net cash flow processes associated with each asset. Suppose that the firm
intends to switch the first asset against the second one at some stopping time θ. We denote
by (Aθt ) the cumulated net cash flow process generated by the firm’s activity until time t
and associated with a switching time θ, i.e.:
Aθt : =
∫ t∧θ
0
er(t−u)S1udu+
∫ t
t∧θ
er(t−u)S2udu
=
∫ t
0
er(t−u)(S1u1{θ>u} + S
2
u1{θ≤u})du = a
1
t∧θ + 1{θ≤t}
(
a2t − a2θ
)
.
Aθ can be negative: indeed, when the net cash flows are negative for a while, the cumulated
cash account may become negative. The implicit assumption is that the firm has a line of
credit to draw from when the cash account is empty and the net cash flows from operating
the business are negative. The cumulated cash (when Aθ is positive) and the credit line
(when Aθ is negative) allow the firm to continue operating in periods of negative cash
flows. We assume the line of credit is time-limited and has the same maturity date T as
the bonds, meaning that at time T the firm has to reimburse not only the bonds, but also
the credit line, if used1.
We assume that the firm is in the default state if at the maturity of the debt contract
T , the cash available is insufficient to reimburse the nominal value of the debt, that is, if:
AθT < N.
Let us denote by Tt the class of stopping times θ with θ ≥ t, that represent possible
switching times of the two assets, after time t. For a given switching time θ ∈ T0, the firm’s
1Note that for simplicity we use for the line of credit the risk-free interest rate, which is lower than the
firm’s cost of borrowing. It can be assumed that the extra yield that normally creditors ask for holding the
firm’s risky debt is included either in an initial fee the firm pays to access this credit facility, or in the final
payment N . However, it is not important in our model to specify this issue.
6 ENDOGENOUS TRADING IN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
Figure 1. Time 0: the investor holds the firm’s liabilities and cash in
amount K.
economic value at time t ≥ 0 is:
V θt = (v
1
t + E
[
e−r(θ−t)(v2θ − v1θ)|Ft
]
)1θ>t + v
2
t 1θ≤t +A
θ
t . (1)
As long as the firm has not yet operate the switching, the firm’s value can be maximized
by switching optimally the first asset against the second one:
Vt : = ess sup
θ∈Tt
V θt = (v
1
t + a
1
t ) + ess sup
θ∈Tt
E
[
e−r(θ−t)(v2θ − v1θ)|Ft
]
. (2)
The solution of this problem will be detailed in Section 3, where we show in particular that
there exists an optimal switching time T` such that V0 = v
1
0 + E
[
e−rT`(v2T` − v1T`)
]
.
We further suppose that at time 0, an investor holds a proportion α ∈ [0, 1] of the overall
firm’s liabilities and cash in amount K ≥ 0. Moreover, we assume that the investor controls
the investment decisions (for instance the investor is a controlling shareholder) of the firm
and in particular can decide the switching time of the assets. The investor’s portfolio in
such a situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The investor’s portfolio attains a maximal value
of αV0 + K, provided the firm’s value is also maximized to V0, by choosing to switch the
two assets time T`. In other words, the optimal firm’s strategy (switching at T`) is also
optimal for the investor in this case.
Suppose now that at time 0 the investor decides to invest part of the cash in a portfolio
of CDS. Is it easy to see that the investor’s economic interest is different in this case,
and there are incentives to deviate from the optimal firm’s strategies. In other words, it is
possible to increase the value of the portfolio by investing in CDS and operating a switching
of the assets at times different from T`. Thus, holding CDS is not neutral for the resulting
firm’s policies. Our aim here will be to see how badly the optimal strategies are affected,
depending on the size of the CDS position.
For computational convenience, we shall suppose that the investor can buy some simple
CDS contracts that pay one dollar in case of default of the firm and zero otherwise (this
is a reasonable assumption for instance when the investor buys CDSs linked to the lowest
seniority debt of the firm). We assume that the market investors anticipate that the optimal
switching time is T`, since this switching time maximizes the firm’s value, therefore the
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price of one CDS time 0 is:
C0 = e
−rTP(AT`T < N).
If the investor decides to invest at time 0 a proportion pi of the available cash K in CDS,
the cash amount used time 0 for investment in CDS equals piK, that is, the investor buys
n(pi) :=
piK
C0
CDS contracts. The rest of (1 − pi)K is kept as cash. However, the time T payment of
the CDS depends on the particular switching strategy that will be eventually implemented
and which can be different from the anticipated one. Hence, at time T , the value of the
investor’s portfolio with corresponding strategies (pi, θ), with θ ∈ T0 being a switching time
from the asset 1 to the asset 2 and pi ∈ [0, 1] being the proportion of the available cash
invested in CDS at time 0, is given by:
vpi,θT = αV
θ
T + (1− pi)KerT + n(pi)1AθT<N
We denote by v∗ the maximal value of the investor’s portfolio that can be obtained by an
optimal combination of CDS investment and switching of the firm’s assets:
v∗ := sup
(θ,pi)
e−rTE[vpi,θT ].
We shall prove in Section 5 that :
v∗ ≥ αV0 +K,
reflecting the fact that there is a benefit for the investor from investing in CDS. Further-
more, it is always optimal to invest 100% of the available cash K in CDS. The optimal
switching strategies and the corresponding profits for the investor are analyzed in Section
6.
3. Optimal firm value and optimal switching time in absence of CDS
investment
In this section we give the expression of the strategy that maximizes the value of the firm,
that is: V0 = supθ∈T0 V
θ
0 . Assuming that market investors anticipate that the manager acts
to maximize the firm’s value, V0 is the market value of the firm at time 0.
We denote:
vt = v
2
t − v1t , t ≥ 0.
The process v is also an arithmetic Brownian motion with negative drift, more precisely:
vt = v0 +mt+ σBt,
where v0 = (y − x)/r + (µ2 − µ1)/r2, m = (µ2 − µ1)/r, σ =
√
σ21/r
2 + σ22/r
2 − 2σ1σ2ρ/r2
and Bt = (σ2W
2
t − σ1W 1t )/(σr).
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Notations. We introduce the following stopping time:
τc := inf{t : vt = c}.
Furthermore, for any stopping time θ, we denote:
fθ(u) := E[e−rθvθ|v0 = u].
Lemma 3.1 (Value of the switching option). We have:
f τc(u) =
{
cea1(u−c), u ≤ c
cea2(u−c), u ≥ c, (3)
where a1,2 = (−m±
√
m2 + 2σ2r)/σ2. Furthermore:
f(u) := sup
θ∈T0
fθ(u) = f τL(u),
with
L = 1/a1 ∨ u.
The function f(u) is the value of the switching option conditional on v0 = u, and τL is the
optimal switching time of the two investments.
Proof. See the appendix. 
For any constant a, we introduce the first hitting time of (−∞, a] by the process Zt :=
S1t − S2t :
Ta(t) := inf
{
s ≥ t ∣∣ Zs := S1s − S2s ≤ a} = inf {s ≥ t ∣∣ vs ≥ −a+ (µ1 − µ2)/rr
}
.
For simplicity, we denote Ta := Ta(0).
Note that in our context v0 = (y−x)/r+(µ2−µ1)/r2 < 0 and L > 0, hence, the optimal
switching time τL characterized in the Lemma 3.1 can be expressed more conveniently as
a first hitting time for the process (Zt). Indeed, we have: τL = T` > 0, where
` := −Lr − (µ1 − µ2)/r = − r
a1
− µ1 − µ2
r
< 0.
Intuitively, the decision of replacing the current investment will be taken when the gener-
ated cash flows will become too low as compared to the cash flows corresponding to the
investment opportunity.
We assume that market investors anticipate that the switching time of the assets is
T`, since this switching time maximizes the firm’s value. It follows from the previous
proposition that:
Corollary 3.2. The market value of the firm at time 0 is:
V0 = sup
θ∈T0
V θ0 = sup
θ∈T0
E
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
+ v10 (4)
= v10 + f(v0),
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and the anticipated switching time is:
T` = inf
{
s ≥ 0 ∣∣ S1s − S2s ≤ `} ,
where:
` = − r
a1
− µ1 − µ2
r
< 0,
a1 = (−m+
√
m2 + 2σ2r)/σ2
m = −(µ1 − µ2)/r.
4. An analysis of the default probabilities associated with different
switching times
Consider a CDS contract that pays one monetary unit in case of default and zero other-
wise. The decision of the firm to switch the two assets will have an impact on the value of
the CDS contract, because it directly affects the generated cash available for reimbursing
the debt, hence the default probability. Indeed, for a switching strategy θ, the the CDS
contract pays at time T the amount:
CθT := 1AθT<N
.
In th is section we find expressions of the default probability P(AθT < N |Ft) associated
with a switching time θ of the assets of the firm. We will then use this result in order
to characterize some incentives of the holder of a naked CDS contract. To begin, let us
denote:
φ1(t, x) : = P
(∫ T
t
e−ruS1udu ≤ x
∣∣S1t = 0)
φ2(t, x) : = P
(∫ T
t
e−ruS2udu ≤ x
∣∣S2t = 0) .
Proposition 4.1. The Ft-conditional default probability associated with the switching time
θ ≥ t is given by:
P(AθT < N |Ft) = φ1(t, ξ1t ) + E
[
1θ≤T
(
φ2(θ, ξ
2
θ )− φ1(θ, ξ1θ )
) |Ft]︸ ︷︷ ︸
switching premium
, (5)
where:
ξ1t : = N − xh(0)−
∫ t
0
h(u)dS1u = N −
∫ T
0
S1u∧te
−rudu
ξ2t : = ξ
1
t + h(t)Zt
Zt : = S
1
t − S2t
h(t) : =
∫ T
t∧T
e−rudu =
e−r(t∧T ) − e−rT
r
,
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and φ1(t, x) and φ2(t, x) are respectively solutions of:
∂φ1
∂t
− ∂φ1
∂x
µ1h(t) +
1
2
∂2φ1
∂x2
σ21h(t)
2 = 0 ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R (6)
φ1(T, x) = 1x≥0 ∀x ∈ R
∂φ2
∂t
− ∂φ2
∂x
µ2h(t) +
1
2
∂2φ2
∂x2
σ22h(t)
2 = 0 ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R (7)
φ2(T, x) = 1x≥0 ∀x ∈ R.
In particular, if the firm does not exchange the investment before time T , the default prob-
ability is:
P(a1T < N |Ft) = φ1(t, ξ1t ).
Proof. Let us denote:
ξ3t : = N − yh(0)−
∫ t
0
h(u)dS2u
and recall that
φ1(t, x) : = P
(∫ T
t
e−ruS1udu ≤ x
∣∣S1t = 0)
φ2(t, x) : = P
(∫ T
t
e−ruS2udu ≤ x
∣∣S2t = 0)
We have:
P(AθT < N |Ft) = E
[
1θ>T1a1T≤N + 1θ≤T1a1θ+a2T−a2θ≤N
∣∣Ft]
=E
[
1a1T≤N + 1θ≤T
(
1a1θ+a
2
T−a2θ≤N − 1a1T≤N
) ∣∣Ft]
=P(a1T ≤ N |Ft) + E
[
1θ≤T
{
P
(
a1θ + a
2
T − a2θ ≤ N |Fθ
)−P (a1T ≤ N |Fθ)} ∣∣∣Ft]
Furthermore:
P(a1T ≤ N |Ft) = P
(∫ T
t
e−ru(S1u − S1t )du ≤ N −
∫ t
0
e−ruS1udu− S1t (e−rt − e−rT )
1
r
)|Ft
)
= P
(∫ T
t
e−ru(S1u − S1t )du ≤ N +
∫ t
0
S1udh(u)− S1t h(t)|Ft
)
= φ1(t, ξ
1
t )
Similarly,
P
(
a1t + a
2
T − a2t ≤ N |Ft
)
= P
(∫ T
t
e−ru(S2u − S2t )du ≤ N +
∫ t
0
S1udh(u)− S2t h(t)|Ft
)
= P
(∫ T
t
e−ru(S2u − S2t )du ≤ ξ1t + (S1t − S2t )h(t)|Ft
)
= φ2(t, ξ
2
t )
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Therefore,
P(AθT < N |Ft) = φ1(t, ξ1t ) + E
[
1θ≤T
(
φ2(θ, ξ
2
θ )− φ1(θ, ξ1θ )
) |Ft]
It remains to show that φ1 and φ2 satisfy respectively the equations (6) and (7) (the
associated boundary conditions are easy to check).
Let us treat first the case of φ1. Notice that the process:
P(a1T ≤ N |Ft) = φ1(t, ξ1t )
is a martingale.
It is immediate from its definition that φ1 ∈ C1,2 and is increasing in x. Therefore, one
can apply Itoˆ’s lemma and impose the drift term of the process φ1(t, ξ
1
t ) to be null. Notice
that ξ1t satisfies the following SDE:
dξ1t = −µ1h(t)dt− σ1h(t)dW 1t ,
and therefore:
dφ1(t, ξ
1
t ) =
(
∂φ1
∂t
(t, ξ1t )−
∂φ1
∂x
(t, ξ1t )µ1h(t) +
1
2
∂2φ1
∂x2
(t, ξ1t )σ
2
1h(t)
2
)
dt− ∂φ1
∂x
(t, ξ1t )ξ
1
t σ1dW
1
t
The PDE (6) follows when imposing the drift above to be null.
Similarly, the process P(a2T ≤ N |Ft) = P
(∫ T
t e
−ru(S2u − S2t )du ≤ ξ3t |Ft
)
= φ2(t, ξ
3
t ) is
a martingale. The equation for φ2 is then derived using the same arguments as in the case
of φ1. 
Below we give an explicit expression for the function φ2. Both the PDE characterization
above and the expression below will be useful later on.
Proposition 4.2. The Ft-conditional default probability associated with a switching time
θ, t ≤ θ < T , is given by:
P(AθT < N |Ft) = E
N
ξ2θ + µ2 ∫ Tθ h(u)du
σ2
√∫ T
θ h(u)
2du
∣∣∣Ft
 , (8)
where N (x) is the distribution function of a standard Gaussian random variable. It follows
that:
φ2(t, x) = N
x+ µ2 ∫ Tt h(u)du
σ2
√∫ T
t h(u)
2du
 , for t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof. Using integration by parts (notice that h(T ) = 0), we have that:
−
∫ T
t
(S2u − S2t )dh(u) =
∫ T
t
h(u)dS2u = µ2
∫ T
t
h(u)du+ σ2
∫ T
t
h(u)dW 2u .
The result then follows easily from Proposition 4.1, since for any stopping time θ,
∫ T
θ h(u)dW
2
u
is independent from Fθ and Gaussian distributed, with zero mean and variance
∫ T
θ h(u)
2du.

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Remark. The three dimensional process (t, ξ1t , Zt)t≥0 is a Markov process with state space
E := R+ × R × R. Furthermore, (ξ1t ) can (and will) be interpreted as an insolvability
indicator at time t: ξ1t = N −
∫ T
0 S
1
u∧te−rudu i.e., difference between the liability due time
T and the cash account under the scenario that from t to T the cash flows are constant
and equal to S1t . Thus ξ
1
t positive can be interpreted as the firm being insolvable as seen
from time t and the higher ξ1t the more insolvable the firm is. Also, when Zθ is positive
the switching option is exercised with a loss.
Finally, let us notice that switching the investment at or after time T does not impact
the time T default probability, that is: P(AθT < N |Ft) = P(Aθ∧TT ≤ N |Ft).
Using the facts emphasized the previous remark in formula (5) leads to the following
more simple expressions of the default probability:
Lemma 4.3. The Ft-conditional default probability for t ≤ T , associated with the switching
time θ ≥ t is given by:
P(AθT < N |Ft) = E
[
φ2(θ ∧ T, ξ2θ∧T )|Ft
]
= E
[
φ2(θ ∧ T, ξ1θ∧T + h(θ ∧ T )Zθ∧T )|(t, ξ1t , Zt)
]
.
From the perspective of a naked CDS holder, the maximal value for the CDS contracts
at time t can be achieved if a switching time is chosen by the firm such that it is a solution
for:
ess sup
θ∈Tt
P(AθT < N |Ft).
The proposition below establishes a partial comparison for the default probabilities associ-
ated with different switching times. We can deduce that, in order to achieve the maximum
default probability, it is always optimal to exercise the switching option with a loss (, i.e.,
Zt > 0 in the stopping set). This is a consequence of the fact that waiting is always optimal
in the profit zone (i.e., when Zt < 0):
Proposition 4.4. Suppose we have two stopping times η and θ such that t ≤ η < θ ≤
T0(t) ∧ T . Then, the following hold:
(1) If Zt = S
1
t − S2t > 0, then:
P(AθT < N |Ft) < P(AηT < N |Ft).
(the sooner we switch the investment, the higher the probability of default; this
works only on [t, T0(t) ∧ T ]).
(2) If Zt = S
1
t − S2t < 0, then:
P(AθT < N |Ft) > P(AηT < N |Ft).
(instead, on [t, T0(t)∧ T ], the later we switch the investment, the higher the proba-
bility of default).
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
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The results are a consequence of the fact that on [t, T0(t)], the process φ2(t, ξ
2
t ), t ≥ 0 is
either a strict supermartingale (if Zt > 0) or a strict submartingale (if Zt < 0). Indeed,
since ξ2t = ξ
3
t −
∫ t
0 e
−ruZudu, we have:
dξ2t =
(−e−rtZt − µ2h(t)) dt− σ2h(t)dW 2t ,
hence, (using first Itoˆ’s lemma, then equation (7)):
dφ2(t, ξ
2
t ) =
∂φ2
∂t
(t, ξ2t ) +
∂φ2
∂x
(t, ξ2t )
{(−e−rtZt − µ2h(t)) dt− σ2h(t)dW 1t }+ ∂2φ2∂x2 (t, ξ2t )h(t)2σ22dt
= −∂φ2
∂x
(t, ξ2t )e
−rtZtdt− ∂φ2
∂x
(t, ξ2t )h(t)σ2dW
2
t .
To conclude, notice that ∂φ2∂x ≥ 0 and furthermore if Zt < 0 then Zs < 0 for s ∈ [t, T0(t)),
respectively, if Zt > 0 then Zs > 0 for s ∈ [t, T0(t)). 
5. Optimal value of the investor’s portfolio when holding a CDS position
We suppose that at time 0 the investor can choose to invest part of the available cash K
in CDS, thus making a bet on its own investment into the firm’s debt to default. We assume
that the CDS position of the investor is not observed by market participants instantaneously
time 0, when the transaction occurs (for instance off balance sheet investments). This is
a reasonable assumption, in the cases where the CDS are traded over the counter and the
trades are rather opaque (for a description of the functioning of the CDS markets, see
Stulz [21]). The amount K should be interpreted as the maximum amount one can invest
in buying CDSs at time 0 without having a market impact.
It follows that the anticipated switching time of the investments is T`. Hence, the market
price at time 0 of a CDS contract that pays one monetary unit at the default event is given
by (using Proposition 4.1):
C0 := e
−rTP(AT`T < N) = e
−rTE(φ2(T` ∧ T, ξ2T`∧T )),
where T` is the switching time that maximizes the firm’s value.
If a proportion pi of the available cash K is invested in CDS, it means the investor buys
n(pi) :=
piK
C0
CDS contracts and (1− pi)K is kept as cash.
As already mentioned Section 2, the default of the firm occurs if at the maturity time of
the debt T , the available cash AθT generated by the investment is insufficient to reimburse
the nominal value of the debt N . This is in general different from the default event
{AT`T < N}, which is anticipated by the market participants at time 0. Therefore at time
T , the true payoff of the CDS is 1{AθT<N}, i.e., it depends on the chosen switching strategy
θ.
The value of the investor’s portfolio with the strategies (pi, θ), where θ ∈ T0 is a switching
time from the investment 1 to the investment 2 and pi ∈ [0, 1] the proportion of the available
14 ENDOGENOUS TRADING IN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
cash invested in CDS at time 0 is given by:
vpi,θt = αV
θ
t + (1− pi)Kert + n(pi)P(AθT < N |Ft).
We recall that V θt is the firm’s value corresponding to the switching strategy θ (see equation
(1)) and the constant α is the proportion of the firm own by the investor. Note that the
CDS are bought time 0 and then hold until the maturity T , while the switching decision
can be made at any date θ ∈ T0.
5.1. The optimization problem with possibilities of CDS investment. We search
for the optimal strategies (θ, pi) ∈ T0 × [0, 1], which solve the problem:
v∗ = sup
(θ,pi)
e−rTE[vpi,θT ] = sup
(θ,pi)
e−rTE[αV θT + (1− pi)KerT + n(pi)1{AθT<N}]. (9)
Our aim is to determine whether there are such strategies (θ, pi) ∈ T0 × [0, 1] that can
lead to a higher portfolio value for the investor than without the trading in CDS, or, stated
otherwise, if the following holds:
sup
(θ,pi)
e−rTE[vpi,θT ] > αV0 +K = sup
θ
e−rTE[v0,θT ].
In other words, we shall compare bidimensional strategies (consisting in investing in CDS
and switching the firm’s assets) with unidimensional strategies (without the possibility of
investing in CDS).
Below, we analyze the problem (9) and show that after some transformations, it is
in fact equivalent to a classical optimal stopping problem, hence can be written in the
form: supθ∈T0 E [Gθ] for some gain or reward process (Gt). The optimal level of the CDS
investment is always pi = 1, that is, the investor will optimally invest all the available
cash in CDS. But, importantly, indifference zones exist, where the CDS position does not
produce any additional gain in average. In this situations, pi = 0 is also optimal.
Let us first have a look to the following sub-problem:
J(θ, pi) := E[e−rTn(pi)1{AθT<N} − piK]
and
j(θ) := sup
pi∈[0,1]
J(θ, pi). (10)
Then, one can notice that our original problem (9) is equivalent to:
sup
(θ,pi)∈T0×[0,1]
e−rTE[vpi,θT ] = K + sup
θ∈T0
E[e−rTαV θT + j(θ)] (11)
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that a switching time θ is fixed. The solution of the problem (10)
is:
j(θ) = max{J(θ, 0), J(θ, 1)} = J(θ, 1)+
Therefore, at time 0 it is either optimal to invest all the cash or nothing in CDS. More
precisely, if:
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(1) P(AθT < N) > P(A
T`
T < N) then, j(θ) = J(θ, 1), hence it is optimal to invest all
the cash in CDS (the market price of the CDS is undervalued);
(2) P(AθT < N) < P(A
T`
T < N) then, j(θ) = J(θ, 0), hence it is optimal to hold entirely
the cash and make no investment in CDS;
(3) P(AθT < N) = P(A
T`
T < N) then, j(θ) = J(θ, 1) = J(θ, pi) = J(θ, 0), any propor-
tion pi is optimal.
Proof. Let us rewrite the function J as:
J(θ, pi) =
piKe−rT
C0
P(AθT < N)− piK
= piK
(
P(AθT < N)
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)
.
Then:
J(θ, pi) ≤ K
(
P(AθT < N)
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)
= J(θ, 1) when P(AθT < N) > P(A
T`
T < N);
respectively:
J(θ, pi) ≤ 0 = J(θ, 0) when P(AθT < N) > P(AT`T < N).

As we shall see further on, the stopping times that lead to the inequality in point 2) of
Lemma 5.1 (i.e., such that P(AθT < N) < P(A
T`
T < N)) are never optimal in (9). All the
other stopping times, i.e., the ones leading to the inequalities in 1) resp. 3) can be optimal.
5.2. An alternative expression for the optimization problem (9). For any fixed
stopping time θ, let us introduce the following (uniformly integrable) martingale:
M θt : = K + αE
[∫ θ
0
e−ruS1udu+
∫ ∞
θ
e−ruS2udu|Ft
]
= K + e−rtαAθt + 1θ>tα
(
e−rtv1t + E[e
−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)|Ft]
)
+ 1θ≤te−rtαv2t
= K + e−rtαV θt .
In particular, for θ = T` and t = 0 we get:
MT`0 = K + α
(
v10 + E[e
−rT`(v2T` − v1T`)]
)
= sup
θ∈T0
M θ0 .
Also, we can notice that:
vpi,θt = M
θ
t e
rt − piKert + n(pi)P(AθT < N |Ft)
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Therefore, using the martingale property of M θ as well as Lemma 5.1, the problem (9) can
be written as:
v∗ = sup
(θ,pi)∈T0×[0,1]
e−rTE[vpi,θT ] = sup
(θ,pi)∈T0×[0,1]
e−rTE[M θT e
rT − piKerT + n(pi)1{AθT<N}]
= (αv10 +K) + sup
(θ,pi)∈T0×[0,1]
(
αE[e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)] + J(θ, pi)
)
= (αv10 +K) + sup
(θ,pi)∈T0×{0,1}
(
αE[e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)] + J(θ, pi)
)
= (αv10 +K) + sup
θ∈T0
αE[e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)] + J(θ, 1)+
= (αv10 +K) + sup
θ∈T0
αE[e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)] +K
(
P(AθT < N)
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)+
To summarize, we need to solve the following infinite horizon problem:
g0 := sup
θ∈T0
αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain/loss from switching the assets
+
(
n0e
−rTP(AθT < N)−K
)+
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain from CDS
, (12)
with n0 :=
K
e−rTP(AT`T <N)
representing the number of CDS that can be bought with the
initial cash amount K.
5.3. Transformation into a classical optimal stopping problem. The problem (12)
is not a classical optimal stopping problem, since it is not of the form: supθ∈T0 E [Gθ]
for some gain or reward process (Gt). The next theorem shows that the problem can be
transformed into a classical optimal stopping problem with finite horizon T .
Theorem 5.2. The optimal portfolio value for the investor is:
v∗ = K + αv10 + g0,
with:
g0 = sup
θ∈T0,T
E
[
G(θ, ξ1θ , Zθ)
]
, (13)
with the gain function:
G(t, a, z) = αe−rt
(
−z
r
− (µ1 − µ2)
r2
)
+K
(
φ2(t, a+ h(t)z)
erTC0
− 1
)
t ∈ [0, T )
G(T, a, z) = αe−rT f
(
−z
r
− (µ1 − µ2)
r2
)
+K
(
φ2(T, a+ h(t)z)
erTC0
− 1
)
,
where (see the formula in Lemma 3.1):
f(u) = Lea1(u−L),
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where a1 = (−m+
√
m2 + 2σ2r)/σ2, L = max(1/a1, u) and
φ2(t, x) = N
x+ µ2 ∫ Tt h(u)du
σ2
√∫ T
t h(u)
2du
 , for t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof. See the appendix. 
6. Optimal investment behavior: numerical implementation
We implement the optimization problem (13) using the Longstaff-Schwartz algorithm
(see the original paper by Longstaff and Schwartz [16], or Cle´ment et al. [6]).
Our base case parameters are:
x = 100; y = 95; µ1 = 2; µ2 = 1; r = 0.05;
σ1 = 7; σ2 = 8; ρ = 0; T = 1; N = 100; K = 200.
For simplicity we assume α = 1. Notice that the optimal strategies for a general α 6= 0
and cash Kα are identical to the ones we study here since the objective function is this
case is the one we study below (i.e., with α = 1), times the constant α.
The optimal firm’s value without CDS investment, corresponding to the base case pa-
rameters is:
V0 :=
x+ µ1/r
r
+ E
[
e−rT`(v2T` − v1T`)
]
) = 2868.054.
The price of one CDS contract with maturity T = 1 year is 0.1853. The cash available
for investment in CDS (K=200) is approximatively 7% the NPV of the first investment
(v10 = 2800) and allows to buy 1079 CDS contracts time 0, which is more that 10 times the
number of contracts that will correspond to a complete insurance against default (i.e., 100
contracts).
In Figures 2–10 below, we plot the values functions and the default probabilities corre-
sponding to the optimal strategies, when respectively the parameters K, N , µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2,
ρ, r, x vary.
More precisely, on the left-hand side of each figure we plot:
(1) the value of the option to switch the firm’s assets (lower, dotted curve):
f(v0) = sup
θ∈T0
E
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
,
(2) the optimized value with CDS (middle, solid curve):
g0 := sup
θ∈T0
E
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
+
(
n0e
−rTP(AθT < N)−K
)+
, (14)
(3) the CDS position (i.e., the number of CDS contracts that are optimally bought at
time 0), which also indicate the gain in case of default, since each CDS contract
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pays 1 dollar in case of default (upper, dashed curve):
n0 =
K
C0
=
K
e−rTP(AT`T < N)
.
On the right-hand side of each figure, we plot the default probabilities:
(1) the anticipated default probability (lower, dotted curve):
pe := P(AT`T < N) = E
[
φ2(T`, ξ
2
T`
)
]
,
which is the default probability anticipated by the market investors;
(2) the optimal default probability p∗ (middle, solid curve), which is the default prob-
ability that corresponds to the optimal switching time in (14).
(3) the maximal default probability that can be obtained by switching the firm’s assets
(upper, dashed curve). This is obtained as solution of:
p¯ := sup
θ∈T0,T
P(AθT < N) = sup
θ∈T0,T
E
[
φ2(θ, ξ
2
θ )
]
;
The following relation holds:
pe ≤ p∗ ≤ p¯.
The levels of the parameters from where the CDS position becomes profitable (in the
sense that g0 is greater that f(v0)) are not always easy to identify visually in the pictures,
since sometimes very small profits from CDS are obtained, and by exercising the switching
option with a loss. In order to make them easy to identify, these levels are marked in each
figure by vertical lines. Thus the pictures are split in two parts, on the one side we have
strategies where the CDS position produces gains and on the other side we have no gains
from the CDS position. The exception is Figure 6, where we did not identify levels of the
parameter µ1 where the CDS position has no gains (the other parameters being fixed).
Before commenting on each of the figures below, let us make some general remarks:
(i) in our pictures, the CDS position n0 is never null (as long as K > 0) since we have
shown in Section 5 that it is always optimal to invest all the available cash K in
CDS. However, it exists an indifference zone, i.e., values of the parameters where
the investor is in fact indifferent between holding the CDS position or cash because
holding the CDS position does not allow the investor to obtain additional gains.
In such situations n0 = 0 is also optimal. In the figures below, these indifference
zones can be identified as the areas when the curves f(v0) and g0 coincide (as was
explained in the paragraph above), or alternatively, the areas where the curves pe
and p∗ coincide.
(ii) It is known from the previous section that in the indifference zone T` is optimal,
meaning that no other switching time will make the profit higher. But T` might
not be the only optimal stopping time and our numerical procedure does not allow
us to characterize the optimal switching boundary. We make the choice to suppose
that in the indifference zone the investor will implement the same strategies as
without the CDS, meaning exercising at T`, since this is optimal (maybe among
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other optimal switching times). We also believe that in practice investors would
not deviate from T` if there is no extra gains from doing so and might decide not
to hold CDS at all, since in this indifference zones pi = 0 is also optimal.
(iii) The main quantities determining the optimal strategies are:
– The value of the option to switch the assets f(v0). This appears as the lower
curve on the left-hand side of each figure. When the value of the switching
option is sufficiently high, the investor will simply adopt the optimal strategy
as without CDS. On the opposite, low values of the switching option incite the
investor to switch the assets with a loss.
– The anticipated default probability pe: it determines the price of a CDS (C0 =
pee−rT ) and therefore how many CDS are initially bought. As mentioned
already pe appears as the lower curve on the right-hand side of each figure.
Also, the corresponding size of the CDS position, appears in the left-hand side
of each figure.
(iv) Most often the two above quantities (f(v0) and p
e) move together in the same
direction. When the value of the switching option f(v0) is low, the first asset
is advantageous (as compared to the second one), and the associated cash flows
high, leading to a relatively low expected default probability pe. An exception to
this rule appears when the parameter µ2 varies. In this case, high return on the
second asset increases the value of the exchange option but decreases the default
probability (since in this case, we get closer of the exchange barrier and the cash
flows from the second asset contribute to reduce the default probability).
(v) Outside the indifference zones mentioned in (i) above, investors have aggressive
strategies (i.e., that lead fast to high default probabilities, close to the maximal
one).
(vi) A portfolio of CDS that corresponds to the levels of default insurance (that is, the
number of CDS bought does not exceed N which is the level of the liability due
time T ) leads to optimal strategies that are the ones as without CDS.
(vii) More CDS in the investor’s portfolio, implies higher deviations from the optimal
strategies, in the sense that p∗ − pe increases.
6.1. Impact of the cash level K (market value of the CDS position) on the
optimal strategies. The impact of the cash level K on the optimal strategies for the
base-case parameters is depicted in Figure 2. n0 is linear in K. We observe that when K is
130 or less, there is no profit from the CDS position, that is, f(v0) = g0 (figure on the left
hand side). Indeed, when K low, few CDS contracts can be bought and the investor will
not have sufficient incentive to deviate from the optimal switching strategy at T`. This also
means that the CDS are fairly priced (market expectations correspond to the investor’s
optimal strategy). However when K increases, the CDS position increases (green curve)
and investors are incited to increase the default risk of the firm, buy switching the assets
with a negative profit. In these cases the CDSs produce a high return: for instance when
K = 200 (base case) the expected gain from CDS g0 − f(v0) is 141.27. We see that the
optimal default probability of the firm p∗ increases steeply from an initial value of 19.48%
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Figure 2. Impact of the cash level K on the optimal strategies: firm’s
value (left) and optimal default probability (right).
(without CDS) to a level of 73.5% which is close to the maximal default probability that
could be implemented, which equals 78.7%.
6.2. Impact of the debt level N on the optimal strategies. The parameter N repre-
sents the value of the firm’s liabilities that are due to be paid at time T = 1 (nominal value
of the debt). It also represents the default barrier. As seen in Figure (3), left, the optimized
gain with CDS g0 decreases when N increases to finally reach the level of the switching
option (which does not depend on the level of N and represents the optimized gain without
CDS). Both the maximal default probability and the expected default probability increase
when N increases. The optimal default probability is not monotone: when N low, CDS
price is low hence the investor can buy many CDS and is tempted to implement a default
probability close to the maximal one. As the level of N increases, the price of the CDS
increases, less CDS can be bought at time 0 and the investor will find optimal to decrease
the default probability up to the level of the expected one (this occurs near N = 102, when
the number of CDS in the portfolio is 598). The most profitable for the investor is when
the firm has low debt, hence low default probability: this permits to buy many CDS (al
low price) and subsequently increase the default risk of the firm and the value of the CDS
by switching the firm’s assets with a loss.
6.3. Impact of the assets volatilities σ1 and σ2 on the optimal strategies. When
the volatility σ1 or σ2 increases, the switching option has more value. The expected default
probability pe increases when σ1 increases, so that the CDSs are becoming more expensive.
In this situation, with high initial volatility (σ1 more than 10) the CDS position generates
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Figure 3. Impact of the debt level N on the optimal strategies: firm’s
value (left) and optimal default probability (right).
no expected gain (f(v0) = g0) and the optimal strategy is to switch the investments as
without CDS, at T`, hence without increasing the default risk as compared to the expected
level. In order to achieve high gains from the CDS position, the investor prefers a low initial
volatility for the firm’s cash flows. For instance, when σ1 is 6, the optimized gain with
CDS is 272.64 and the exchange option is 57.9. The default probabilities are pe = 15.6%,
p∗ = 72.1% and p¯ = 77.78%.
Because at time 0 the underlying is rather far from the hitting level ` where the two
assets are expected to be switched (more precisely, P(T` ≤ T ) is very low for the param-
eters considered), the effect of σ2 on the expected default probability is very low, and by
consequence the price of the CDS is constant (the same thing holds when the expected
return of the second asset µ2 varies, see subsection below). Because the CDS position stays
practically constant with higher σ2, the indifference level (where f(v0) = g0) is reached
with higher volatility compared with the case when σ1 was considered (here we have σ2 at
least 20 for the CDS position to generate no expected gain)
6.4. Impact of the assets expected returns µ1 and µ2 on the optimal strategies.
The impact of the expected return µ1 is as follows: when µ1 increases f(v0) decreases
(less interesting to switch the first asset against the second); also the anticipated default
probability decreases (more likely to accumulate sufficient cash for reimbursing the debt).
For the parameters considered the optimal strategy with CDS is always different from the
optimal strategy in absence of CDS. More precisely, we can observe the following:
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Figure 4. Impact of the volatility of the first investment σ1 on the optimal
strategies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default probability (right).
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Figure 5. Impact of the volatility of the second investment σ2 on the
optimal strategies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default probability
(right).
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• the scenario with low µ1 corresponds to high value of the switching option, high
expected default probability and hence low CDS position. The market anticipated
switching time T ` is closer: the optimal barrier ` is closer to reach by the process
Z. The investor’s optimal strategy consists mainly in not switching the assets once
the barrier ` is hit, hence keeping the first asset longer. This strategy increases the
probability of default as compared to the anticipated one;
• the scenario with high µ1 corresponds both to low value of the switching option
and high CDS position. This combination incites the investor to implement a high
optimal default probability mostly by switching the assets with a loss.
The non-monotonicity of the value function and optimal default probability can be ex-
plained as follows. An increase in the parameter µ1 has a double effect. First, less of
sample paths of the process Z actually reach the barrier ` and more sample paths reach a
high losses region. Secondly, the CDS contract is cheaper, hence the CDS position increases.
Therefore, as µ1 increases, even though the investor becomes more eager to increase the
default probability, he actually becomes less able to implement the strategy of postponing
the switching decision at Z = `. Instead, gradually, the strategy of premature exercising
with high losses becomes more effective. It is not always the case that one effect dominates
the other, hence the non-monotonicity of the above mentioned functions.
For instance, when µ1 = 7: (i) there are 3285 CDS in the portfolio, that is more than 32
times the level of a complete insurance, (ii) the switching option is almost null f(v0) ∼ 0,
(iii) the expected default probability is 6.4%, (iv) the optimal default probability is 45%,
(v) the expected profit from the CDS position is g0 − f(v0) = 96.55 which is approx. 48%
of the initial investment in CDS (K = 200).
As a comparison, when µ1 = 1 (i.e, the same value as for µ2): (i) there are 915 CDS
in the portfolio, that is almost 9.2 times the level of a complete insurance, (ii) the value
of the switching option is f(v0) = 212, (iii) the optimal default probability is 73.9%, (iv)
the expected profit from the CDS position: g0 − f(v0) = 148 which is 74 % of the initial
investment in CDS.
Notice that µ1 = 4.5 is the parameter that leads to the lowest optimal default probability
(p∗ = 26%) and closest to the one without CDS (pe = 12%).
As mentioned already, for the parameters considered the optimal strategy with CDS is
never the same as without CDS. This is because the CDS position is always very important,
for all ranges of µ1 considered. But if we consider a lower CDS investment, for instance
K = 100, we get that the optimal strategy with CDS is the same as without CDS as long
as µ1 ≥ 2 (other parameters being as in the base case).
Concerning the expected return of the second asset µ2, the effects are: f(v0) and µ2
move in the same direction, but very little effect on the expected default probability (and
hence on the size of the CDS position), which decreases when µ2 increases. We are in a
situation different from the usual setting: here the indifference point, where there is no
profit from the CDS position (the investor implements the optimal strategy as without the
CDS ) is attained for when the exchange option has low value (here this occurs for µ2 ≤ 0).
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Figure 6. Impact of the level of the expected return of the first invest-
ment µ1 on the optimal strategies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default
probability (right).
-2 -1 0 1 2
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Expected return of the second investment Μ2
V
al
ue
fu
nc
tio
n
-2 -1 0 1 2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Expected return of the second investment Μ2
D
ef
au
lt
pr
ob
ab
ili
tie
s
Figure 7. Impact of the level of the expected return of the second invest-
ment µ2 on the optimal strategies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default
probability (right).
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6.5. Impact of the correlation coefficient ρ. The correlation coefficient ρ between the
two Brownian motions W 1 and W 2 determines the volatility of the process Z = S1 − S2:
when ρ = −1 the volatility of Z is the highest, and equals σ1+σ2 = 15 , while for ρ = 1 the
volatility is the lowest, |σ1 − σ2| = 1. As a consequence, the value of the exchange option
decreases when ρ increases, as displayed in Figure 8. The profit function g0 which includes
the effect of the CDSs also decreases when ρ increases, however the decrease takes place at
a slower rate, so that in fact the net profit from CDS given by g0 − f(v0) increases. The
value of the CDS position is n0 = 1079 contracts, independent of the correlation (we did
not display the curve for n0, flat).
Concerning the default probabilities, the expected default probability does not much
react to the change in correlation. This is due to our base case parameters. In fact, an
increase of the correlation produces a double effect on the default probabilities. First, as
already mentioned, the optimal switch of the assets occurs earlier, hence has more chances
to occur before the maturity of the debt. The optimal switch brings in new cash at the
switching time, hence decreases the default probability. The second effect has an inverse
impact, as the second asset produces less cash on average than the first one (µ2 < µ1).
For our base case parameters, these effects are not visible in Figure 8, because they have
a small size hence seem perfectly compensating each other. But, if for instance we choose
µ1 = µ2 = 2, the other parameters being the same, the expected default probability for
ρ = 1 is 19.48% while for ρ = −1 it becomes 19.30%, hence a small effect becomes visible.
With µ1 = 2 and µ2 = 4, the expected default probability decreases from 19.48% (for
ρ = 1) to 18.25% (for ρ = −1).
The implemented default probability p∗ is decreasing when the correlation coefficient
increases, the investor being less able to produce losses to the firm.
6.6. Impact of other variables: interest rate r and the initial value of the first
asset x. The impact of these variable is depicted in Figures 9 and 10. The behavior is
the classical one: low r (resp. low x) leads to higher value of the exchange option and also
higher expected default probability. In this case the optimal strategies with and without
CDS are the same. As r (resp. x) increases, the exchange option loses value and the
default probability is lower (hence CDS position higher). The investor implements optimal
strategies that lead to higher default probabilities as r (reps. x) increases beyond the
indifference point (this is when r ≥ 0.04 resp. x ≥ 98).
7. Conclusions
This paper analyses the possible drawbacks of large CDS positions in terms of investment
strategies and risk taking incentives. Second best choices for investment decisions, could
become first best in the presence of these products, when used mainly for speculative
purposes.
In this paper, we attempt to apprehend these risks in a real options setting. Thus, we
have quantified the default risk of a firm when a shareholder can at the same time influence
its management decisions and hold CDSs. We have analyzed an optimal asset replacement
problem for various sizes of the CDS position. In our paper, the investor is only allowed to
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Figure 8. Impact of the level of the correlation coefficient ρ on the optimal
strategies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default probability (right).
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Figure 9. Impact of the level of the interest rate r on the optimal strate-
gies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default probability (right).
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Figure 10. Impact of the initial value of the first investment x on the
optimal strategies: firm’s value (left) and optimal default probability
(right).
invest some fixed amount of cash at most, since in practice, only a limited amount of CDSs
can be bought at a given market price, that is, without having a market impact. Moreover,
we assumed that the market price is an equilibrium price that corresponds to the maximal
firm’s value (i.e., when the management decisions are implemented in order to maximize
the firm’s value). Our main findings are that the default risk of the firms increases sharply
in presence of large CDS portfolios, that exceed several times the levels of the complete
insurance. However, when the size of the CDS portfolio is moderate we find that the CDS
position does not alter the firm’s default probability. There is no incentive in this case for
the investor to invest in CDSs (he is in fact indifferent between investing or not) and if
he invests, the default probability of the firm is not modified in presence of CDSs, within
these indifference zones.
One interesting question for future research would be to analyze the optimal behavior for
the investor when the market price for the CDSs is higher than the one we have considered.
This can occur for instance when market participants anticipate some deviations from the
optimal management strategy. Alternatively, one can argue that large positions of CDSs
cannot be constructed at the cheapest price because of a limited supply at a given point in
time. In this situation, we expect the investor to be sometimes discouraged from buying
the CDSs (this would produce losses zones that would include and exceed our considered
indifference zones). We do not investigate this situation in this paper, but we can expect
that the investor would take a binary decision: either not invest in the CDSs at all (when
he is not able to have a sufficiently large CDS position, hence is in the loss zone), or invest
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integrally his available cash (when this leads to an important CDS position) and implement
much more aggressive strategies in terms of default risk.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
The function f τc is a solution of the following:
−rf +m∂f
∂x
+
σ2
2
∂2f
∂x2
= 0
lim
x→c f(x) = c
lim
x→+∞ f(x) = limx→−∞ f(x) = 0
The general solution of the ODE above is given by: f(x) = Aea1x + Bea2x, with a1
and a2 the roots of the equation
σ2
2 a
2 + ma = r. One can check that indeed a1,2 =
(−m ± √m2 + 2σ2r)/σ2, as stated in the lemma. Notice that a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. Using
then the boundary conditions, one can find that indeed the function f τc is as stated.
For maximizing over the possible levels of c, we need to distinguish the two cases u ≤ c
and u ≥ c. Notice that for c ≤ u we have f τc(u) ≤ u = f τu(u), and hence:
f(u) = max{sup
c≥u
f τc(u), sup
c≤u
f τc(u)} = max{sup
c≥u
cea1(u−c), u}.
The supremum of the function c 7→ cea1(u−c) is attained at c = 1a1 , hence the optimal
switching time is: L = 1a111/a1≥u + u11/a1≤u = max{1/a1, u}.
B. Proof of Theorem 5.2
The original problem (12) and the problem (13) in the theorem do not look the same:
they do not have the same gain process, nor the same horizon. We are going to show that
however, the two problems have the same sup, which is obtained using the same optimal
exercising time.
We first show that the sup in (12) can be obtained by solving a classical optimal stopping
problem with infinite horizon, then we apply the dynamic programming principle in order
to transform it in a finite horizon problem.
We denote:
G˜t := αe
−rt
(
−Zt
r
− (µ1 − µ2)
r
)
+K
(
φ2(t ∧ T, ξ2t ∧ T )
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)
t ∈ [0,∞), (15)
so that:
E
[
G˜θ
]
= αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
+K
(
P(AθT < N)
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)
.
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Notice that:
g0 = sup
θ∈T0
αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
+K
(
P(AθT < N)
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)+
= max
{
sup
θ∈T0
αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
; sup
θ∈T0
αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)
]
+K
(
P(AθT < N)
P(AT`T < N)
− 1
)}
= max
{
αE
[
e−rT`(v2T` − v1T`)
]
; sup
θ∈T0
E
[
G˜θ
]}
= max
{
E
[
G˜T`
]
; sup
θ∈T0
E
[
G˜θ
]}
= sup
θ∈T0
E
[
G˜θ
]
Therefore,
g0 = sup
θ∈T0
E
[
G˜θ
]
, (16)
which is a classical optimal stopping problem with infinite horizon, and leads to the same
optimal stopping time than the original formulation. Using the dynamic programming
principle, we will now transform it in a finite horizon problem.
For this purpose, we generalize the problem (16) to all times t ≥ 0:
gt : = ess sup
θ∈Tt,∞
αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)|Ft
]
+
(
n0e
−rTP(AθT < N |Ft)−K
)
(17)
= ess sup
θ∈Tt,∞
(fθt + h
θ
t ).
We have also introduced the notation:
fθt := αE
[
e−rθ(v2θ − v1θ)|Ft
]
which is the gain/loss from switching the assets at the stopping time θ, and:
hθt :=
(
n0e
−rTP(AθT < N |Ft)−K
)
.
which is the gain/loss from the CDS position.
Notice that for the situations where T ≤ t ≤ θ the gain form CDS stays constant and is
independent of the switching time θ:
hθt =
(
n0e
−rTP(AθT < N |Ft)−K
)
=
(
n0e
−rTP(ATT < N |Ft)−K
)
=
(
n0e
−rT1{a1T<N} −K
)
= h∞T ;
and we only have an option to switch the investment in the optimal stopping problem (17).
Or, the solution of this problem has been already detailed in Section 3.
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Hence from Section 3, for t ≥ T , the optimal stopping time in the problem above is
T`(T ), in particular, for t = T we have:
gT = ess sup
θ∈TT,∞
(fθT + h
∞
T ) = f(vT ) + h
∞
T = f
T`(T )
T + h
∞
T = GT .
Hence, using the dynamic programming principle (see for instance Karatzas and Shreve
[15], Appendix D), we obtain:
g0 = sup
θ∈T0
E
[
1{θ<T}G˜θ + 1{θ≥T}gT
]
= sup
θ∈T0,T
E[Gθ],
hence we have proved the result.
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